The Questionable Engineering of Oceangate - Summary

Summary

The OceanGate submersible, which was on a dive to the Titanic wreck site, lost contact with the surface and later imploded due to a catastrophic failure of its composite hull. The failure was likely caused by a combination of factors, including the use of carbon fiber composites, which are not well-suited for deep-sea applications, and inadequate testing and inspection procedures. The company's decision to skip industry-standard classification tests and instead rely on a single test dive with a licensed marine surveyor was also a critical error. The submersible's hull was prone to snap buckling, a failure mode that is unique to composite materials in deep-sea applications, and the company's acoustic monitoring system was not effective in predicting failure. The incident highlights the dangers of prioritizing innovation and profit over safety and the importance of rigorous testing and inspection procedures in the engineering industry.

Facts

Here are the key facts extracted from the text:

1. The OceanGate submersible began its descent to the Titanic's remains on June 19th.
2. The submersible had a descent rate of 55 meters per minute.
3. It would take the submersible 70 minutes to reach its destination.
4. With each passing minute, the equivalent of 5.3 atmospheres of pressure would be added to the sub's hull.
5. By the time it reached its target depth, the weight of 366 of Earth's atmospheres would be attempting to crush it.
6. The submersible is made of a carbon fiber composite hull with titanium end caps.
7. The hull is 3800 meters deep.
8. The submersible lost contact with the surface an hour and 45 minutes into the dive.
9. The submersible imploded due to a sudden catastrophic collapse.
10. The submersible was not tested with a regulatory body.
11. The submersible's design was not fatigue-tested.
12. The submersible's hull was cured using a cheaper alternative to an autoclave.
13. A former employee, David Lockridge, was fired after raising concerns about the composite hull.
14. The company's CEO, Stockton Rush, ignored expert advice and chose to pilot the submersible himself.
15. The submersible's acoustic monitoring system was not effective in detecting failure.
16. The company's blog post mentioned that they did not undergo industry-standard classifications.
17. The submersible's design was not innovative, but rather a known manufacturing practice.
18. The company's move-fast-and-break-things mantra is attributed to the influence of SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic.